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IN THE 
OF THE 
SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE 
VAN ZYVERDEN, his wife, 
Plaintiff, Respondents 
and Cross-Appellants, 
vs. 
RALPH W. FARRAR and HEL.EN R. 
FARRAR, his wife, and 
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
LEO VAN ZYVERDEN and SYTSKE 
VAN ZYVERDEN, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT, 
SEAGULL INVESTMENT COMPANY 
No. 9945 
No. 9946 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Action by Van Zyverdens to collect $18,000.00 loss of 
anticipated profits from proposed cattle ranch operation 
allegedly prevented because of seller's alleged failure to 
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furnish Van Zyverdens with the use of $3,190.00 and 
action by Seagull against Van Zyverdens for restitution 
of premises, damages for breach of contract, attorney fees 
and triple damages for unlawful detainer. No part of the 
$55,000.00 purchase price, taxes, water assessments, etc. 
of ranch have been paid, either to sellers or into court, 
although Van Zyverdens have had possession of farm 
since September, 1960. Van Zyverdens contend that per-
formance of their obligations was excused and postponed 
until litigation is concluded. Van Zyverdens also ask for 
specific performance requiring Seagull to convey the 
ranch to them. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court entered judgment of no cause of 
action against all parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Seagull seeks reversal of judgment of no cause of action 
on Seagull's claims, restitution of farm, damages for 
breach of contract, attorney fees, interest, and/or triple 
damages for unlawful detainer and judgment affirming 
the decision of no cause of action against Van Zyverdens. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in Seagull's appeal 
brief on file herein is incorporated by reference. 
The voluminous statement of alleged facts contained 
in Van Zyverdens' brief are largely unsupported by the 
evidence and record and are for the most part vigorously 
disputed by Seagull, however, Seagull feels it necessary 
to present the true facts and issues in some detail. The 
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correct facts with respect to some of the more important 
disputed statements contained in Van Zyverdens' state-
ment of facts are as follows: 
1. Is intent material to issues: 
The alleged "intent" of the parties, claimed by Van 
Zyverdens, to the effect that the parties intended that the 
pennission granted in exhibit 1 (R. 227) for Van Zyver-
dens to "exchange" the milk base and milking equipment 
sold with the farm for " ... livestock or horses of equal 
value, remaining security for the period of 2 years ... " is 
a warranty and guarantee by the seller that they would 
assume obligation to enable the "sale or exchange" to be 
made, is untrue, is immaterial to the issues in the case 
(see pre-trial order R. 181-182) and constitutes an at-
tempt: (a) to re-write the pre-trial order, (b) to add to 
and vary the terms of the contract by parol evidence and 
(c) an attempt to reform the contract without pleading 
fraud or mistake or asking for reformation by (d) calling 
their attempted reformation an interpretation of the 
"intent" of the parties. 
Farrar testified that he was not aware that Van Zyver-
den had added language about exchange of milk base 
when he executed the real estate contract (R. 580-581). 
\ran Zyverden himself testified that there was nothing 
said about the transfer of the milk base at the time the 
contract was signed (R. 51); that he never discussed with 
the sellers his present claim to the effect that he would 
be unable to pay for the ranch if the milk base could not 
be exchanged (R. 52); that before he signed the contract 
he did not consider that he would be unable to perform 
his obligations under the contract if the milk base could 
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not be exchanged (R. 538) and that he wanted permission 
to exchange the milk base in the event that he could not 
make the grade with a dairy operation (R. 538). 
It is obvious after examining Van Zyverden's own 
testimony that all of the talk in Van Zyverdens' brief 
about "intent of_ the parties," "conditions precedent" and 
specific discussions and agreements as to exact profits to 
be realized from the beef operation as the only operation 
contempla.ted by the parties when the contract was 
signed, is incorrect and not supported by th~ record. The 
lack of evidence to support their wild assertions concern-
ing intent, conditions precedent, damages, etc. is very 
apparent from the absence of citations ~o the place in the 
record where such evidence is found. 
2. Had dairy been a failing operation: 
Representations by Van Zyverdens that undisputed 
evidence shows business failures by five previous occu-
pants is untrue. The only evidence of failure to make a 
profit by Van Camp, Mecham, Collier or Bowers, the 
persons who received possession of the ranch from 
Farrars, is failure ofVan Camp to make a profit, however, 
Farrar testified that the reason that Van Camp failed to 
make a profit was because he was only on the ranch for 
five days (R. 572). Aluminum Roofing Company acquired 
possession from Bowers, defaulted, and Farrar repos-
sessed the ranch immediately before Van Zyverdens 
acquired possession. There is no evidence to show the 
reason why Aluminum Roofing Company defaulted and 
accordingly the statement that the ranch had a history of 
business failure is simply not supported by the record. 
See additional discussion under point IV. 
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3. Miscellaneous incorrect statements alleged as facts 
in Van Zyverdens' brief: 
The following allegations in Van Zyverdens' statement 
of facts are untrue and unsupported by the record: 
(a) The allegation that the parties agreed that the 
ranch would "continue" to be unsuccessful as a dairy, 
(b) that the ranch could only be operated profitably as a 
beef operation, (c) that no other type of operation 
was contemplated by the parties, (d) that the conversion 
to a beef operation was impossible except by sale or 
exchange of milk base and equipment to provide Van 
Zyverdens with working capital, (e) that the seller un-
derstood and agreed that payment of the purchase price 
could only be made with profits from beef operations 
since. (f) and that the parties were aware that Van 
Zyverden, himself, had no funds to go into the beef 
business. These alleged facts are discussed below: 
4. Was previous dairy operation successful: 
It is apparent from the record that the dairy operations 
had been at least moderately successful, that even Van 
Zyverdens operated the property as a dairy farm (R. 
540) and that the milk base and milking equipment 
acquired in connection with the dairy operation were 
valuable assets (R. 54 7, 637). 
5. Did parties contemplate a horse, sheep or beef op-
eration: 
The contract itself (R. 227) indicates that Van Zyver-
dens contemplated some type of "livestock" or "horse" 
,~enture on the ranch at the time that the contract was 
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executed. Van Zyverden testified that "My planning 
instead of to run dairy cattle there to have beef cattle 
there, or sheep or horses especially." (Emphasis added) 
(R. 539). 
6. Did parties compute anticipated profits: 
The foregoing testimony is clearly contrary to the 
basic premises of the Van Zyverden case, to-wit: (a) that 
the parties contemplated no venture except a beef opera-
tion on the ranch and (b) to theory of the tender of 
proof as to alleged anticipated profits from the beef opera-
tion and (c) contrary to the allegation that the figures 
mentioned in the offer of proof were exactly the figures 
allegedly discussed by the parties and specifically agreed 
upon as the profits to be made by Van Zyverdens from 
the beef operation. Obviously the parties did not spe-
cifically agree upon the figures suggested by Van Zyver-
dens for a beef operation since the beef operation was 
only one of several suggested operations for the ranch. 
Even if the parties tried to anticipate the gains or losses 
from such a speculative venture, their estimates would 
be vague and uncertain and would not for rna proper 
basis for measuring damages. 
7. Did parties agree that milk base would finance Van 
Zyverdens' beef operation: 
The contention that the sellers knew that Van Zyver-
dens had no funds to finance the alleged beef operation on 
the ranch and that they knew that payments could not be 
made except from profits is contrary to reason and com-
mon sense. Van Zyverdens would have the Court believe 
that Farrars were so anxious to sell the ranch to Van 
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Zyverdens with no down payment, with nothing to be 
paid for over a year and then only from profits, if any, 
realized from operation of the farm, that they were will-
ing to finance Van Zyverdens' operation by not only per-
mitting Van Zyverdens to sell the milk base and equip-
ment included in the sale, but undertook to "warrant and 
guarantee" that the sale of the base and equipment could 
be accomplished. 
8. Does contract permit a "sale" of milk base: 
The contract (R. 226-227) permits an "exchange" and 
not a "sale" of the milk base. No offer of exchange of the 
milk base or equipment was ever presented by Van 
Zyverden (R. 553-554). The milk equipment could be 
exchanged at any time without restriction (R. 226-227, 
230-231). 
9. Was exchange of milk base a condition precedent to 
Van Zyverdens' obligations: 
Van Zyverden testified that he did not say anything to 
anyone about not being able to perform his obligations 
under the purchase contract if he had any difficulty or 
delay in transferring the milk base (R. 539, L. 11-18) and 
that, at the time that he prepared the purchase contract 
(R. 226-227), he did not think that transferability of the 
milk base was sufficiently important to put a time limit 
on its transfer (R. 539, L. 19-22). 
The only statement in the record which even discusses 
the liberal terms of the purchase of the farm is a vague 
statement, by Van Zyverden, that he had no money him-
self and that he was concerned about the liberal terms 
being offered him by Farrar (R. 503-504), which testi-
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mony obviously referred to Van Zyverdens obtaining 
possession of the farm with no down payment, not to the 
wild and wholly unsupported contentions of Van Zyver-
dens to the effect that they would not have to make any 
payments on the purchase price except from profits and, 
in effect, that if the milk base could not be exchanged at 
all that Van Zyverdens would be excused from paying for 
the ranch at all. (See Van Zyverden brief, Page 36.) 
10. Did delay in exchanging milk base prevent beef 
operation: 
Had Van Zyverden completed the proposed sale of the 
milk base to Peart he would have had $3,190.00 (R. 547, 
L. 27-30) available to him in the spring of 1961 (R. 21, L. 
16-20). Van Zyverdens' contention that they were pre-
vented from going into beef business by the transfer of 
the milk base being delayed until June 15, 1962, is 
obviously incorrect since Van Zyverdens had sufficient 
funds or credit to purchase 25 milk cows in March of 
1961, which obviously cost more than the $3,190.00, and 
probably cost about $450.00 each or a total of about 
$11,250.00 (R. 611, L. 16-20, R. 612, L. 17-19). Beef cattle 
were generally available on the market and no one 
stopped Van Zyverdens from purchasing beef cattle for 
the ranch (R. 557, L. 18-22). 
11. Van Zyverdens elected to operate a dairy: 
Obviously the alleged delay in exchanging the milk 
base for cattle was not the reason that Van Zyverdens 
elected to go into the dairy business instead of the beef 
business in the spring of 1961. It is important to note that 
in his letter of March 3, 1961 (R. 232) concerning ship-
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ping milk to Hiland Dairy, no mention was made of selling 
or exchanging the milk base. Obviously Van Zyverdens 
at that time had elected to use the base to permit them to 
sell milk from their 25 cows instead of attempting a sale 
of the milk base itself. 
12. Inadequacy of offer of proof: 
There is no suggestion in the record, offer of proof, or 
Van Zyverdens' brief, that operating expenses, labor, feed 
costs, possible loss from disease or other causes, etc. were 
discussed. There is nothing in the record or offer of proof 
from which the Court could determine the net profit that 
Van Zyverden expected to make from this new, highly 
speculative, proposed beef venture. Even if the milk base 
at $3,190.00 (R. 547) and equipment at $1,850.00 (R. 524, 
637) provided sufficient funds (approximately $5,000.00) 
to purchase 100 head of beef animals weighing 300 pounds 
each (R. 525) in the spring, it would be impossible for 
them to operate through the summer and pay expenses of 
operation if in fact they had no other funds available. 
Certainly they would have been doomed to failure before 
they began. If we examine the proposed venture a little 
closer we can see how ridiculous their offer of proof 
actually is. 100 head of animals at 300 pounds each would 
weigh a total of 30,000 pounds. If they were purchased for 
$5,000.00 this would mean that the purchase price would 
be 16% cents per pound rather than the 25 cents per 
pound which Van Zyverdens allege (without support in 
the record) that they could realize for weight gain. If, on 
the other hand, the correct price of beef is 25 cents per 
pound, it would have cost $7,500.00 to purchase the 100 
head of cattle, and Van Zyverdens would have been 
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$2,500.00 short of having enough money to purchase the 
100 head. If Van Zyverdens were able to borrow the 
$2,500.00 (they deny that funds were available to them) 
and to repay it in the fall, from the sale of animals, to 
enable them to buy the entire 100 head and in fact the 
animals gained the full 2 pounds per day for the full 180 
days suggested by Van Zyverdens, and they had no losses 
of animals, they would have only $9,000.00 available from 
the operation to pay the annual contract payment due of 
$6,334.17 (R. 33, 288), the property taxes of $397.82, the 
water assessments of $333.98, or a net of $1,934.03 would 
have been left to absorb and pay all other costs and 
expenses including labor, feed, repairs, power, gasoline, 
supplies, telephone, travel expense, seed, harvesting hay 
and grain, loss from accident or disease, and the multi-
tude of other expenses incidental to such an operation. 
To make enough profit from the operation to make the 
payment of $6,334.17 on the ranch (R. 33, 288) alone, 
would require a 127% profit on the $5,000.00 investment 
and in excess of a 70% profit on gross income from the 
operation ($6,334.17 -=- $9,000.00 == 70.38% return re-
quired to make payment). The $5,000.00 invested in cattle 
could not be used to make the annual payment because 
the contract expressly states that the cattle are to remain 
as security for a period of two years (R. 226-227). Van 
Zyverdens allege that, in addition to paying expenses and 
making the payment on the purchase price, they expected 
to earn a small profit for themselves from the venture 
(R. 525). I am certain that, if we could make a 127% 
return on our investment by raising beef cattle, we would 
all be out raising beef cattle. 
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Van Zyverden allegedly paid $5,779.75 in operating ex-
penses (R. 221) and $4,412.49 for repairs, maintenance, 
etc. (R. 220) during this period, so funds must have been 
available to Van Zyverdens, contrary to the assertions in 
their brief. This also gives some indication of part of the 
operating costs which could have been reasonably ex-
pected to be incurred in a beef operation and clearly 
demonstrates that little or no profit would have been 
realized from the proposed beef operation, therefore pay-
ment of the taxes, water assessments and the annual 
contract payment could not have been from profits, as 
alleged by Van Zyverdens in their brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
VAN ZYVERDENS' CROSS-APPEAL SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO FILE BOND FOR 
COSTS. 
Rule 73(c), URCP, reads in part as follows: 
" (c) BOND ON APPEAL. At the time of filing the 
notice of appeal, the appellant shall file with such 
notice a bond for costs on appeal, unless such bond is 
waived in writing by the adverse party, or unless an 
affidavit as hereinafter described is filed ... " (Em-
phasis added) 
Seagull has not waived the requirement that Van 
Zyverdens file a bond for costs, no impecunious affidavit 
has been filed, and accordingly Van Zyverdens are not 
excused from filing an appeal cost bond. Van Zyverdens 
have not filed a bond as required by Rule 73 (c) and 
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accordingly their cross-appeal has not been perfected and 
should be dismissed. This question has been before the 
Court on numerous occasions, and the rule is well estab-
lished that where respondent or appellant filed no under-
taking, or a pauper affidavit, or unless same is waived by 
adverse party, the appeal will be dismissed. Buttrey v. 
Guaranteed Securities Co., 78 U. 39, 45, 300 P. 1040; Cook 
v. Oregon Short Line & U. N. Ry. Co., 7 U. 416, 27 P. 5; 
Provo Reservoir Co. v. Tanner, 68 U. 21, 249 P. 118; Moser 
v. Lundahl, 97 U. 222, 92 P.2d 340; Johnston v. Geary, 84 
U. 47, 33 P.2d 757. 
Appeal cost bonds are required for cross-appeals in the 
same manner as for other appeals, and the failure of a 
cross-appellant to file a cost bond invalidates the cross-
appeal. Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co., supra. 
POINT II 
VAN ZYVERDENS' CROSS-APPEAL IS VOID BE-
CAUSE RULE 74(b), URCP IS INVALID. 
Rule 74 (b) purports to permit a party to cross-appeal 
without filing a notice of appeal after the time for appeal-
ing has expired. Prior to the adoption of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, no statutory procedure existed which 
permitted a cross-appeal, except by filing a notice of 
appeal in the same manner as was required for other 
appeals. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated 
by the Supreme Court pursuant to authority delegated to 
it by 78-2-4, UCA, 1953, which reads in part as follows: 
RULES-MAKING POWER.-The Supreme Court 
of the state of Utah has power to prescribe, alter and 
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revise, by rules, for all courts of the state of Utah ... 
the practice and procedure in all civil and criminal 
actions and proceedings, including rules of evidence 
therein .... Such rules may not abridge, enlarge or 
modify the substantive rights of any litigant . . ." 
(Emphasis added) 
Rule 82. URCP, further limits the scope of the rules, 
which rule reads as follows: 
"These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit 
the jurisdiction of the courts of this state or the venue 
of actions therein.'' (Emphasis added) 
Rule 74 (b) purports to permit the filing of a cross-
appeal after the time for filing of an appeal has otherwise 
expired. Under the law in existence prior to the adoption 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the Supreme Court 
had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal or cross-appeal 
filed after the statutory time for filing of a notice of appeal 
had expired. Christiansen v. Los Angeles and S. L. R. Co., 
77 U. 85, 106, 291 P. 926; Allen v. Garner, 45 U. 39, 143 P. 
228; Sorenson v. Korsgaard, 83 U. 177, 27 P.2d 439; Blyth 
& Fargo Co. v. Swenson, 15 U. 345, 49 P. 1027; Henderson 
v. Barnes, 27 U. 348, 75 P. 759. Rule 74(b) purports to 
create the right to file a cross-appeal after the usual time 
for filing an appeal has expired, although no such right 
existed, and the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain 
such an appeal under former law. Clearly rule 74(b) 
attempts to "extend" the jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court, "abridges" the substantive rights of Seagull con-
cerning the right of Van Zyverdens to appeal and "en-
larges" the substantive rights of Van Zyverdens with 
respect to said appeal, and accordingly is invalid because 
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it was promulgated in violation of and in excess of the 
express limitation on rule-making power of the Supreme 
Court specified in 78-2-4, UCA, 1953 (supra), and in 
violation of the express prohibition contained in Rule 82, 
URCP (supra) and would tend to construe the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure in such manner as to extend the 
jurisdiction of the Court. The Supreme Court has no 
jurisdiction to entertain Van Zyverdens' cross-appeal 
except in accordance with the provisions of Rule 74(b), 
and accordingly, since that rule is invalid and its promul-
gation vvas in excess of the power of the Court the cross-
appeal of Van Zyverdens should be dismissed. 
POINT III 
VAN ZYVERDENS' CROSS-APPEAL SHOULD BE 
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION BY REA-
SON OF THE FAILURE TO FILE CROSS-APPEAL 
WITHIN TIME SPECIFIED BY LAW. 
Filing of notice of appeal within time required by law is 
essential to clothe Supreme Court with jurisdiction to 
adjudicate questions raised by the appeal. Anderson v. 
Halthusen Mercantile Co., 30 U. 31, 83 P. 560; Johnson v. 
Geary (supra) ;First Nat'l. Bank of Ogden v. Nielsen, 
60 U. 227, 208 P. 522; Anderson v. Anderson, 3 U. (2d) 
277, 282 P.2d 845. No notice of appeal was filed by Van 
Zyverdens as required by the provisions of Rule 73 (b), 
URCP. Van Zyverdens' attempt to cross-appeal pursuant 
to Rule 7 4 (b), URCP, in their brief submitted October 4, 
1963. Seagull's brief was filed September 6, 1963 and Van 
Zyverdens' brief was accordingly due September 26, 1963. 
(Rule 75(p) (1), URCP.) If in fact Van Zyverdens were 
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permitted under law to file a cross-appeal in their brief 
(which we deny- see discussion under point II), the 
time for Van Zyverdens to file their appeal would thereby 
be extended until the due date of Van Zyverdens' brief. 
Van Zyverdens failed to file their brief, containing said 
purported cross-appeal, within the time provided by law. 
The Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the questions raised by the cross-appeal because Van 
Zyverdens' cross-appeal was not filed even within the 
extended time mentioned in Rule 74, URCP. 
After the time for filing of Van Zyverdens' cross-appeal 
had passed they discovered this fact, and on the 2nd day 
of October, 1963 obtained an order from the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court which purported to extend the time 
for filing their brief and cross-appeal. Once the time for 
appeal had expired the Supreme Court lost all j~risdiction 
and has no power to consider the matters raised in the 
cross-appeal. Rule 73 (a) , URCP. provides the only cir-
cumstances under which the Court may extend the time 
for appealing, Which Rule 73(a) reads in part as follows: 
" ... The time within which an appeal may be taken 
shall be one month from the entry of the judgment 
appealed from unless a shorter time is provided by 
law, except that upon a showing of excusable neglect 
based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of 
the judgment the district court in any action may 
extend the time for appeal not exceeding one month 
from the expiration of the original time herein pre-
scribed .... " (Emphasis added) 
The said order purporting to extend the time for Van 
Zyverdens to file their cross-appeal was granted on 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
grounds of mistake of law as to the period allowed for 
filing a cross-appeal and was, and is, in excess of the 
power of the Court, therefore it is void and of no effect 
whatsoever. Mistake of law is not "excusable neglect." 
Everyone is presumed to know the law. 
The Supreme Court has held that neither Rule 6 (b), 
granting the Court power to extend where a failure to 
act in time is due to "excusable neglect" generally, nor 
Rule 60 (b) ( 1) authorizing the Court to relieve from a 
final judgment for inadvertence or excusable neglect, ap-
plies where the appeal has not been taken in time, and 
t~hat Rule 73 (a) quoted above prescribes the only cir-
cumstance under which the Court may extend the time 
for filing an appeal. Anderson v. Anderson, supra. The 
clear wording of Rule 73 (a) (supra) not only restricts the 
right of the Court to extend time for filing an appeal to 
situations where the appellant failed to discover the entry 
of the judgment as a result of "excusable neglect," but 
also states that such order must be made by the "District 
Court," and does not authorize the Supreme Court to 
make an order extending the time for filing of an appeal. 
To permit the order signed by the Chief Justice, pur-
porting to extend the time for filing the cross-appeal, to 
confer jurisdiction upon the Court to hear the appeal after 
the time for filing said appeal had expired, would be to 
wholly disregard the clear meaning of Rule 82, URCP 
(supra), which states that the rules of civil procedure 
shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction 
of the courts, and to disregard the limitation imposed by 
78-2-4, UCA, 1953 (supra) on the rule-making power of 
the Supreme Court, which statute expressly forbids the 
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Supreme Court to promulgate rules which " ... abridge, 
enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant 
... " If the Supreme Court has not and cannot make a rule 
which permits it to extend the jurisdiction of the Court, 
clearly the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be extended 
b~' an order signed by a Justice thereof. 
POINT IV 
COURT'S DECISION THAT VAN ZYVERDENS' 
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Van Zyverdens' entire case is founded upon their in-
terpretation of the following wording contained in the 
ranch real estate contract (R. 227) : 
"It is agreed that the Highland milk base and all 
milking equipment as mentioned above can be ex-
changed for livestock or horses of equal value re-
maining security for a period of two years as agreed 
above." 
It appears that a prior contract (R. 230-231) restricted the 
transfer of the milk base (R. 606) until June, 1962 (R. 
602, 638) and that by reason of that restriction a proposed 
sale of the milk base to Pert was delayed. They contend 
that all of the parties intended and agreed that the pro-
posed beef operation was to be financed solely with pro-
ceeds from sale of the milk base and milking equipment, 
that the parties intended the wording of the contract to 
constitute an undertaking, warranty and guarantee by 
sellers that the milk base could be conveyed to a third 
party. that said conveyance was a condition precedent to 
their obligations under purchase agreement, that their 
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performance was excused until such conveyance could be 
accomplished, and now claim $18,000.00 damages for al-
leged breach of contract, alleging that amount of loss of 
anticipated profit, which they claim that they expected to 
make during 1961 from the proposed beef operation (R. 
4), however, this claim now seems to be reduced to 
$9,000.00 (Van Zyverden brief, P. 26). 
The Court very properly held that Van Zyverdens' 
claim was not supported by the wording of the contract or 
the evidence and awarded judgment against them for no 
cause of action (R. 189). 
The decision of the Court denying relief to Van Zyver-
dens is obviously correct and any one of the many legal 
propositions andjor facts mentioned below and the an-
swers to the propositions urged by Van Zyverdens, con-
tained herein, are sufficient to affirm the decision of the 
District ·court. 
1. Is the contract ambiguous: 
Authorities cited by Van Zyverdens' brief concerning 
determination of intent of parties in interpreting con-
tracts w·hich are ambiguous and therefore open to con-
struction (brief P. 14-15) refer to obviously ambiguous 
agreements. The permission granted to Van Zyverdens by 
the contract to "exchange" the milk base and equipment 
is clear and unambiguous. Van Zyverdens seek, by parol 
testimony, to show that the clear wording is in fact 
ambiguous and then seek to add to and vary the terms of 
the written agreement by further parol evidence. They in 
effect seek (a) a determination that the words "can be 
exchanged" used in the contract (R. 227) are ambiguous, 
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permitted under law to file a cross-appeal in their brief 
(which we deny- see discussion under point II), the 
time for Van Zyverdens to file their appeal would thereby 
be extended until the due date of Van Zyverdens' brief. 
Van Zyverdens failed to file their brief, containing said 
purported cross-appeal, within the time provided by law. 
The Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the questions raised by the cross-appeal because Van 
Zyverdens' cross-appeal was not filed even within the 
extended time mentioned in Rule 74, URCP. 
After the time for filing of Van Zyverdens' cross-appeal 
had passed they discovered this fact, and on the 2nd day 
of October, 1963 obtained an order from the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court which purported to extend the time 
for filing their brief and cross-appeal. Once the time for 
appeal had expired the Supreme Court lost all jurisdiction 
and has no power to consider the matters raised in the 
cross-appeal. Rule 73 (a) , URCP, provides the only cir-
cumstances under which the Court may extend the time 
for appealing, ~rhich Rule 73 (a) reads in part as follows: 
" ... The time within which an appeal may be taken 
shall be one month from the entry of the judgment 
appealed from unless a shorter time is provided by 
law, except that upon a showing of excusable neglect 
based on a failure of a party to learn of the entry of 
the judgment the district court in any action may 
extend the time for appeal not exceeding one month 
from the expiration of the original time herein pre-
scribed .... " (Emphasis added) 
The said order purporting to extend the time for Van 
Zyverdens to file their cross-appeal was granted on 
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grounds of mistake of law as to the period allowed for 
filing a cross-appeal and was, and is, in excess of the 
power of the Court, therefore it is void and of no effect 
whatsoever. Mistake of law is not "excusable neglect." 
Everyone is presumed to know the law. 
The Supreme Court has held that neither Rule 6 (b), 
granting the Court power to extend where a failure to 
act in time is due to ''excusable neglect" generally, nor 
Rule 60 (b) ( 1) authorizing the Court to relieve from a 
final judgment for inadvertence or excusable neglect, ap-
plies where the appeal has not been taken in time, and 
t~hat Rule 73 (a) quoted above prescribes the only cir-
cumstance under which the Court may extend the time 
for filing an appeal. Anderson v. Anderson, supra. The 
clear wording of Rule 73 (a) (supra) not only restricts the 
right of the Court to extend time for filing an appeal to 
situations where the appellant failed to discover the entry 
of the judgment as a result of "excusable neglect," but 
also states that such order must be made by the "District 
Court," and does not authorize the Supreme Court to 
make an order extending the time for filing of an appeal. 
To permit the order signed by the Chief Justice, pur-
porting to extend the time for filing the cross-appeal, to 
confer jurisdiction upon the Court to hear the appeal after 
the time for filing said appeal had expired, would be to 
wholly disregard the clear meaning of Rule 82, URCP 
(supra), which states that the rules of civil procedure 
shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction 
of the courts, and to disregard the limitation imposed by 
78-2-4, UCA, 1953 (supra) on the rule-making power of 
the Supreme Court, which statute expressly forbids the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
Supreme Court to promulgate rules which " ... abridge, 
enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant 
... " If the Supreme Court has not and cannot make a rule 
which permits it to extend the jurisdiction of the Court, 
clearly the jurisdiction of the Court cannot be extended 
b~· an order signed by a Justice thereof. 
POINT IV 
COURT'S DECISION THAT VAN ZYVERDENS' 
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Van Zyverdens' entire case is founded upon their in-
terpretation of the following wording contained in the 
ranch real estate contract (R. 227): 
"It is agreed that the Highland milk base and all 
milking equipment as mentioned above can be ex-
changed for livestock or horses of equal value re-
maining security for a period of two years as agreed 
above." 
It appears that a prior contract (R. 230-231) restricted the 
transfer of the milk ·base (R. 606) until June, 1962 (R. 
602, 638) and that by reason of that restriction a proposed 
sale of the milk base to Pert was delayed. They contend 
that all of the parties intended and agreed that the pro-
posed beef operation was to be financed solely with pro-
ceeds from sale of the milk base and milking equipment, 
that the parties intended the wording of the contract to 
constitute an undertaking, warranty and guarantee by 
sellers that the milk base could be conveyed to a third 
party. that said conveyance was a condition precedent to 
their obligations under purchase agreement, that their 
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performance was excused until such conveyance could be 
accomplished, and now claim $18,000.00 damages for al-
leged breach of contract, alleging that amount of loss of 
anticipated profit, which they claim that they expected to 
make during 1961 from the proposed beef operation (R. 
4), however, this claim now seems to be reduced to 
$9,000.00 (Van Zyverden brief, P. 26). 
The Court very properly held that Van Zyverdens' 
claim was not supported by the wording of the contract or 
the evidence and awarded judgment against them for no 
cause of action (R. 189). 
The decision of the Court denying relief to Van Zyver-
dens is obviously correct and any one of the many legal 
propositions andjor facts mentioned below and the an-
swers to the propositions urged by Van Zyverdens, con-
tained herein, are sufficient to affirm the decision of the 
District Court. 
1. Is the contract ambiguous: 
Authorities cited by Van Zyverdens' brief concerning 
determination of intent of parties in interpreting con-
tracts which are ambiguous and therefore open to con-
struction (brief P. 14-15) refer to obviously ambiguous 
agreements. The permission granted to Van Zyverdens by 
the contract to "exchange" the milk base and equipment 
is clear and unambiguous. Van Zyverdens seek, by parol 
testimony, to show that the clear wording is in fact 
ambiguous and then seek to add to and vary the terms of 
the written agreement by further parol evidence. They in 
effect seek (a) a determination that the words "can be 
exchanged" used in the contract (R. 227) are ambiguous, 
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(b) to reform the contract to express the true agreement 
between the parties and (c) to have the Court enforce the 
reformed agreement and to thereby impose the affirma-
tive duty and guarantee upon sellers to accomplish an 
exchange of the milk base and (d) to excuse Van Zyver-
dens from all performance or payment of their obligations 
under the contract until this has been accomplished. 
All words and expressions used by the parties in a 
contract must be given full force and effect, unless to do 
so leads to an absurdity or is contrary to the ntanifest 
purposes and intentions of the parties. Udy v. Jensen, 63 
U. 94, 222 P. 597; Burt v. Stringfellow, 45 U. 207, 143 P. 
234. The meanings of the words used by the parties are 
clear. (Emphasis added) 
(a) Meaning of "Can" (R. 227): 
The word "can" has the same meaning as "may,'' 
Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank of Verdon v. USF&G 
Co., 133 NW. 247, 248, 28 SD 315, 36 LRA NS 1152; Pana-
torium v. McLaughlin, Neb., 215 NW 798, 799; Sikes v. 
State. 67 Ala. 77, 81, and the word "can" means to "give 
permission." The word "can" has also been defined as 
meaning 'possible," Ballantyne v. Rusk, 36 A. 361, 362, 84 
Md. 649; "to be able/' Hannon v. Myrick, 111 A2d 729, 
731, 118 Vt. 431, "to be enabled by law" and "to have a 
right to," Bailey Realty & Loan Co. v. Bunting, 19 So. 2d 
607. 608, 31 Ala. App 450, Town of Barton v. Town of 
Albany, 189 A. 853, 856, 108 Vt. 531. No definitions of the 
word '"can" have been located which expressly or by 
implication mean "guarantee" or "warranty" as urged by 
\Tan Zyverdens. The word "warranty" has essentially the 
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same meaning as "guarantee" and in effect makes the 
person giving the "warranty" an insurer. Obviously the 
obligations of an insurer are not undertaken lightly, and 
should not be imposed upon a person unless his intention 
to assume such a vast and sweeping obligation is clear 
from the plain wording of the contract. 
In our situation the words "can be exchanged" in effect 
give Van Zyverdens permission to exchange one type of 
security for a different type of security in the event that 
they desired to make the "exchange" and go into the 
horse, sheep or livestock business (R. 539). 
(b) Meaning of word "exchange": 
Van Zyverdens take the position that the word "ex-
change" includes the right to sell for cash. It is true that 
after the contract was executed the parties attempted to 
sell the milk base for cash with an escrow of the proceeds 
and to thereby modify the contract, however, that trans-
action was not completed and does not constitute a modi-
fication of the "exchange" provision of the contract and 
does not change the clear meaning of the contract or 
make it ambiguous. The alleged "contemporaneous" con-
duct referred to in the Van Zyverden brief (P. 16-22) is 
actually the acts done by Farrar after the agreement was 
signed to "go the second mile" and assist Van Zyverden 
in attempting to sell the milk base for cash, even though 
he had no obligation to do so under the terms of the 
contract. There is simply no evidence to support the 
theory of Van Zyverden that the attempted sale was 
pursuant to the terms of the written agreement. Farrar 
agreed to a sale of the milk base on terms different from 
the "exchange" requirement of the contract and sent the 
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letter (R. 246) to Hiland Dairy to carry out the terms of 
their new agreement concerning the proposed cash sale 
to Pert (R. 582). 
The conduct of Farrar in ''going the second mile" to 
assist Van Zyverden and the other conduct of the parties 
does not indicate that word "exchange" had any meaning 
to the parties other than its usual meaning. No "ex-
change'' proposal, which would comply with the terms of 
the contract, was ever presented to the sellers, and ac-
cordingly Van Zyverdens cannot now complain that they 
were deprived of the right to make a non-existent "ex-
change." Van Zyverdens ':vere not damaged by the failure 
of the proposed cash sale to Pert since they were not 
e!ltitled to insist on a sale for cash under the terms of the 
contract. 
The word ''exchange" has been uniformly defined by 
the courts as meaning a transfer of property for property 
or something of value other than money; Burger-Phillips 
Co. v. Comm. of Int. Rev., CCA Ala., 126 F. 2d 934, 936, 
and relates to the mutual giving and receiving of com-
modities without the intervention of money, U. S. v. 
Paine, D.C. Mass., 31 F. Supp. 898, 900. A "sale" is a 
transferring of goods for money, and an "exchange" is a 
transferring of goods by way of barter. Dairymen's 
League Co-op Ass'n. v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of 
N.Y., 8 NYS 2d 403, 412, Words and Phrases, Vol. 15A, P. 
131 and cases there cited. 
(c) Construing- ambiguous contracts: 
If the contract is in fact ambiguous (which we deny) , 
since Van Zyverden selected the wording which he now 
claims to be ambiguous (R. 505, 528, 551), any ambiguity 
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contained therein is being construed most strongly against 
Van Zyverdens. Bryant v. Deseret News Publishing Co., 
120 U. 241, 233· P.2d 355; 26 ALR 2d 1131; Handley v. 
Mutual L. Ins. Co., 106 U. 184, 147 P.2d 319; 152 ALR 
1278; Restatement of Contracts, Vol. 1, Sec. 236; 12 Am. 
Jur. Contracts 252. 
(d) Van Zyverden is an experienced realtor: 
This common sense rule of construction against the 
person who selected the language which that person now 
contends is ambiguous is particularly applicable in our 
case where Van Zyverden had 10 years experience in the 
real estate business (R. 496, 558), in the preparation of 
real estate contracts (R. 558) and the use of abstracts and 
title insurance in connection with the verification of title 
(R. 558-559). 
(e) Certainty of Error required for reformation: 
Where the contract is clear and unambiguous and all of 
its terms are explicit and certain, as in our case, the con-
tract is not open to construction, Burt v. Stringfellow, 
supra. There is a presumption that the written contract 
correctly evidences the agreement of the parties and 
reformation will not be granted upon a probability and 
usually not upon a mere preponderance of the evidence, 
but only upon certainty of the error. Forrester v. Cook, 
77 U. 137, 292 P. 206, 209; Weight v. Bailey, 45 U. 584, 147 
P. 899; Cram v. Reynolds, 55 U. 384, 186 P. 100. 
2. Is the question of ambigu~ty properly before the 
Court: 
Van Zyverdens' authorities, cited in support of the 
proposition that the Court should inquire into the intent 
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of the parties, all deal with situations where the contracts 
being interpreted were obviously ambiguous and open to 
construction by the Court. In our case we must go outside 
of the four corners of the instrument if we are to show 
any ambiguity since the wording in question, "can be 
exchanged" is plain, simple and unambiguous. 
The question of ambiguity appears to be an after-
thought by Van Zyverdens' attorney after the trial since 
the complaint and pre-trial order make no mention of 
ambiguity, fraud or mistake. It appears from a review of 
the Van Zyverden brief that their basic contention is to 
the effect that the parties mistakenly used words in the 
contract 'vhich did not convey the true intention of the 
parties. and now seek to correct that alleged error by 
asking the Court to interpret the language in such a 
n1anner as to amount to a reformation, but seek to avoid 
the burden of proof required, their failure to plead the 
circumstances of fraud or mistake with particularity as 
required by Rule 9(b), URCP, and their failure to frame 
this as an issue in the pre-trial order by calling their 
requested relief an interpretation of alleged ambiguous 
wording in the contract rather than a reformation. The 
Utah Supreme Court has long held that in the absence of 
fraud or mistake, parol evidence is not admissable to 
contradict, vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a 
valid written instrument. Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden The-
atre Co., 82 U. 279, 17 P.2d 294, 90 ALR 1299; Last Chance 
Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 82 U. 475, 25 P.2d 952. The matters 
before the Court can be summarized as follows: 
(a) Van Zyverdens' complaint: 
The only allegation in Van Zyverdens' complaint re-
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garding the milk base reads as follows (R. 3, Par. 4): 
"4. Defendants have failed and refused to allow plain-
tiffs to exchange the Highland milk base and milking 
equipment for livestock or horses of equal value, as 
provided in said contract, and have thereby breached 
said contract." (Emphasis added) 
The complaint obviously makes no reference to refor-
mation of the contract, the alleged intent of the parties or 
claim that this exchange is a condition precedent to their 
obligations under the contract. The evidence shows that 
the complaint fails to state a cause of action since it is 
undisputed that the milking equipment was at all times 
freely transferable (R. 230-231, 628), but no offers of 
exchange of the equipment were ever presented (R. 553, 
L. 17-23), although it was worth $1,850.00 (R. 524) and no 
offers to exchange milk base were ever presented (R. 541, 
L.i. 17-19); that Seagull and their assignor Farrars not only 
did not "refuse to allow an exchange" as alleged in Van 
Zyverdens' complaint, but both did everything in their 
power to assist Van Zyverdens in arranging for a transfer 
of the milk base on terms even more liberal than specified 
in the contract (R. 541) and the milk base was actually 
transferred to Van Zyverden about March 25, 1961 (R. 
543). The alleged refusal of Seagull and Farrar to permit 
an exchange as alleged in the complaint (R. 3, Par. 4) is 
not supported by the evidence and judgment of no cause 
of action is accordingly not only proper but required. 
(b) The pre-trial order: 
The issues before the Court as limited by the pre-trial 
order (Rule 16, URCP) pertaining to Van Zyverdens' 
claims are as follows (R. 181-182): 
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"1. Were the defendants (Farrars & Seagull) obli-
gated under the contract of sale within a reasonable 
time after the date of the contract to permit the 
exchange of the milk base therein mentioned or to 
permit the Plaintiffs (Van Zyverdens) to exchange 
the milk base for livestock or horses of equal value. 
2. Did the Defendants have a duty to facilitate the 
exchange." 
3. Have the Plaintiffs been damaged thereby? 
4. If so, in what amount." (Emphasis added) 
The express wording of the pre-trial order limits the 
issues to the obligations imposed "under the contract,'' 
and makes no mention of any "intent" of the parties 
which is not expressed in the actual wording of the con-
tract. The obligations mentioned in the pre-trial order 
consist of a possible duty to "perm·~t the exchange" or a 
possible "duty to facilitate the exchange." As demon-
strated under paragraph 2 (a) above, Seagull and Farrars 
have not only been willing at all times to permit the 
exchange, but have also done everything in their power 
to facilitate the exchange (R. 541). The question of dam-
ages would necessarily not arise unless there were a 
breach of the duty mentioned in paragraphs 1 or 2 of the 
pre-trial order (R. 181-182). It is clear that the Van 
Zyverdens' claims as shown by the pre-trial order are 
essentially the same as those contained in the complaint, 
and that the evidence shows conclusively that no cause of 
action exists under the Van Zyverden claims contained in 
either the complaint or pre-trial order, and accordingly 
the judgment of no cause of action against Van Zyverdens 
should be affirmed. 
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(c) Parol evidence rule: 
Van Zyverdens' attempt to introduce oral testimony to 
(1) show that the contract is ambiguous and (2) to 
change the terms from mere permission for Van Zyver-
dens to make an exchange, to make sellers assume an 
affirmative duty to make possible and guarantee that the 
milk base could be exchanged or sold and to excuse Van 
Zyverdens' performance of their obligations under the 
purchase agreement until the sale could be accomplished. 
The proposed oral evidence clearly violates the express 
provisions of the parol evidence rule which has been codi-
fied as 78-25-16, UCA, 1953 and which reads as follows: 
"there can be no evidence of the contents of a writing 
other than the writing itself, except ... '' (certain 
exceptions not pertinent herein follow). 
The Utah Courts have long held that in the absence of 
fraud or mistake, parol evidence is not admissable to 
contradict, vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a 
valid written instrument. Fox Film Corp. v. Ogden The-
atre, Co., supra; Last Chance Ranch Co. v. Erickson, 
supra. The vast changes suggested by Van Zyverdens 
certainly violate the express provisions of the above 
quoted statute, and attempt to "contradict, vary and add 
to" the terms of the contract (R. 226-227). 
(d) Merger clause: 
The real estate contract in question (R. 226-227) con-
tains a merger clause (R. 226, Par. 20) which reads in 
part as follows: 
"20. It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by 
the parties hereto ... that there are no representa-
tions, covenants, or agreements between the parties 
hereto with reference to said property except as 
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herein specifically set forth or attached hereto-
none." 
Van Zyverden testified that he was familiar with the 
contents of said merger clause and that he typed the word 
"none'' in the blank at the end of the sentence (R. 559, L. 
12-21), thus indicating that there were in fact no agree-
ments between the parties other than those spelled out in 
the contract and that any other conversations or agree-
ments were deemed to be merged into the written instru-
ment or abandoned. W·here the parties expressly agreed 
to a merger clause their agreement should not be lightly 
disturbed. Forrester v. Cook, supra. 
The rule has long been established in Utah that where 
parties have deliberately put their contract in writing, 
and there is no uncertainty as to the extent of their 
respective rights and obligations under the contract, it 
cannot be overturned or varied by showing prior or con-
temporaneous oral agreements in conflict with or at 
variance with the written instrument. McCormic v. Levy, 
37 U. 134, 106 P. 660. 
(e) Notice of restriction on milk base from chain of 
title: 
Van Zyverdens' argument concerning alleged miscon-
duct of Farrar in concealing restriction on milk base is in 
essence a charge of fraud (Brief, P. 18-22) used in induc-
ing Van Zyverdens to purchase the ranch. They have not 
pleaded fraud as required by Rule 9 (b), URCP, or set it 
up as an issue in the pre-trial order and the alleged fraud 
has not been proven by clear and convincing evidence as 
required by law. Even if fraud were present and proved 
(which we deny) , Van Zyverdens would still not be 
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entitled to relief because they have constructive knowl-
edge of the milk base restriction since it appears on the 
fact of documents in the chain of title. They are not per-
mitted to shut their eyes or ears to the inlet of information 
and are charged with notice of all facts to which that 
inquiry will lead when prosecuted in good faith and with 
reasonable diligence. Texas Co. v. Aycock, 190 Tenn 16, 
227 SW 2d 41, 17 ALR 2d 322 and cases there cited. Con-
structive notice is the same in effect as actual notice. Coal 
Co. v. Doren, 142 U.S. 417; Northern Pac. R.R. Co., 21 
Was 320, 55 P. 210; Universal CIT Corp. v. Courtesy 
Motors, Inc., 8 U. 2d 275, 333' P.2d 628; McGarry v. 
Thompson, 114 U. 442, 201 P.2d 288. 
Van Zyverden, a realtor with 10 years experience (R. 
496), who was familiar with the preparation of real estate 
contracts (R. 558), the use of abstracts of title in connec-
tion with verification of title and with title insurance 
(R. 558) and obviously well versed in real estate trans-
actions, testified that he made no investigation of the 
title to the ranch (R. 529), that he was aware of the 
Michelsen contract (which contained the restriction on 
the milk base) when the contract was executed (R. 529), 
although he had previously testified to the contrary (R. 
504) , that Farrar had the Michelsen contract in his hand 
but that he did not ask to see it (R. 532-533). The slightest 
effort to investigate title and the instruments in his actual 
presence would have disclosed the restriction on milk 
base, concerning which he now complains. 
The facts that the wording of the Michelsen (R. 230-
231) and Van Zyverden (R. 226-227) contracts, pertain-
ing to the milk base, are identical except for the period of 
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the restriction; that the restrictions expired at the same 
date and that the word "extension" is misspelled in both 
contracts as "Extention" is strong evidence that Van 
Zyverden probably actually copied the wording for his 
contract from the Michelsen contract which contained the 
milk base restriction which is the basis of his claims in 
this lawsuit (R. 227 and 230). 
The evidence and law discussed above show con-
clusively that Van Zyverdens have not pleaded or proven 
a cause of action and that the District Court judgment of 
no cause of action should be affirmed. 
POINT V 
VAN ZYVERDENS IN FACT SUFFERED NO DAM-
AGES FROM ALLEGED BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
The trial court very properly ruled that if Van Zyver-
dens were entitled to recover anything by reason of the 
non-transferability of the milk base that it " ... would be 
the value of the milk base itself ... " (R. 520), and re-
jected Van Zyverdens' offer of proof as to the profits 
which they thought that they could have made from a 
beef operation (R. 528) . 
Related questions with respect to damages concerning: 
adequacy of the offer of proof was discussed at page 11 
of this brief, inconsistencies and wild assertions concern-
ing anticipated profits contained in the offer of proof are 
discussed at pages 6, 11, lack of intent to actually engage 
in a beef operation at the time of execution of the contract 
are discussed at pages 6, 10, and whether delay in ex-
changing milk base in fact prevented beef operation are 
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discussed at page 9 and accordingly will not be repeated 
here. 
The profits (or losses) to be anticipated from conver-
sion of a dairy into a new beef venture by persons who 
apparently had no experience in raising beef would be at 
best wildly speculative. Since the parties themselves 
could not expect to reasonably foresee the income and 
expenses to be expected from this new operation, cer-
tainly one party could not be heard to say that general 
discussions concerning what they hoped to make (if there 
were in fact any such discussions) would provide a suffi-
cient basis for computing lost profits to ascertain damages 
with reasonable certainty. (See rules and examples where 
profits were easily determined, quoted at page 23 of Van 
Zyverden brief.) 
If in fact there was a breach of contract by reason of 
the delay in transferring the milk base (which we deny), 
the damages, if any, resulting therefrom could easily be 
ascertained. If the sale to Pert had been completed as 
contemplated, the $3',190.00 (R. 547) received therefrom 
would have been released from escrow and made avail-
able to Van Zyverdens about May 1, 1961 (R. 505). The 
restrictions on transferability of the milk base were re-
moved on June 15, 1962 (R. 560, 602). Interest is the ex-
clusive measure of damages for breach of contract to pay 
or for the detention of money. Croft v. Jensen, 86 U. 13, 
40 P.2d 198 at Page 202. At the most Van Zyverdens were 
deprived of the use of $3,190.00 from May 1, 1961 to June 
15, 1962, and accordingly would at the most be entitled to 
recover interest of $208.77 computed at legal rate of 6% 
per annum, however, because of a change in policy by 
,,., 
.. 
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Hiland Dairy, the milk base was 360 pounds and at $10.00 
per pound (R. 547) was worth $3,600.00 on June 15, 1962, 
and at the time of the trial (R. 549). Van Zyverdens ac-
cordingly made a profit of $410.00 on the value of the base 
by waiting to dispose of it, and after deducting the 
interest of $208.77 due for loss of use of the funds as 
aforesaid, Van Zyverdens actually had a profit of $201.23. 
The Court must consider all circumstances which may 
have occurred to the date of the trial in measuring dam-
ages, whether such circumstances increase or reduce the 
amount of damages. (61 ALR 126, s. 100 ALR 1201.) The 
evidence clearly shows that Van Zyverdens actually sus-
tained no legally recoverable damages from the restric-
tions upon transfer of the milk base, even if that issue had 
been properly before the Court, which it was not as 
discussed above. 
The assertion by Van Zyverdens at page 27 that they 
are entitled to recover $13,812.49 allegedly invested by 
them in the property is not an issue in Van Zyverdens' 
complaint, the pre-trial order or the trial of the case, and 
there is no evidence in the case to support the amounts 
claimed or Van Zyverdens' allegation that the property is 
now worth $85,000.00. Obviously $5,000.00 of the amount 
claimed to have been invested in the ranch constitutes 
credit allowed to Van Zyverdens for some equipment and 
livestock which they were supposed to bring on the prop-
erty as additional security, but most of which has now 
disappeared if it in fact was ever brought to the property. 
Van Zyverdens still haYe exactly the same equipment and 
livestock as they had before the transaction, except to the 
extent that they have disposed of it. The additional 
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amounts claimed by Van Zyverdens undoubtedly repre-
sents operating and maintenance costs allegedly expended 
on the property which are detailed in their offer of proof 
made after the trial which was rejected by the Court. 
(R. 219-220.) 
The assertion by Van Zyverdens that the transferability 
of the milk base was a condition precedent to their obli-
gation to perform their obligations under the purchase 
contract and excused them from performing until that 
condition was met (page 25 of Van Zyverden brief) is so 
unreasonable that it is hardly worth considering. If this 
theory were carried to its logical conclusion, Van Zyver-
dens would have us believe that Farrar was so anxious to 
sell them the ranch with no down payment and nothing 
to be paid for over a year that they agreed to finance their 
operation by permitting the liquidation of part of the 
ranch assets, and agreed that if the assets could not be 
liquidated that Van Zyverdens would be entitled to retain 
the farm without paying for it or being required to pay 
the taxes, water assessments, insure the buildings, etc. 
Obviously no one would sell a $55,000.00 farm on such 
terms. 
The value of the milk base is approximately lj2 of 1% 
of the purchase price of the ranch. The Utah Supreme 
Court considered a similar situation involving a sewer 
connection that had not been made, the cost of which was 
about 1f2 of 1% of the purchase price of the house, in 
Erisman v. Overman, 11 U. 2d 258, 358 P.2d 85, and denied 
equitable relief because there was an adequate legal 
remedy available, and stated that "If there is a legal 
remedy available to which resort may be had without sub-
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stantial, irreparable damage, one may not seek equity." 
The Court also stated that "Equity will not pick up pins." 
The rule is well established that where payments are to 
be made in installments and the conveyance is not to be 
made until full payment (as in our case), the promise to 
pay is unconditional except as to the last payment. 55 Am. 
Jur. vendor and purchaser 102, 106; Crampton v. Mc-
Laughlin Realty Co., 99 P. 586 (Wash. 1909). See also 
discussion at pages 682-686 of record. 
Van Zyverdens obtained funds or credit necessary to 
purchase 25 cows in the spring of 1961, yet claim that 
they were prevented from going into the beef business 
because they were not permitted the use of $3,190.00 for 
a little over a year. This argument is also obviously 
unsound. Van Zyverdens got what they bargained for but 
were unable to pay. They have retained possession of the 
use of and the income from the ranch since September, 
1960, without paying anything toward the purchase price, 
taxes, water assessments or insurance, and now they 
claim that they have been damaged. 
POINT VI 
SEAGULL IS ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF RE-
QUESTED IN ITS APPEAL BRIEF ON FILE HEREIN. 
Most of the matters mentioned by Van Zyverdens in 
their points IV and V have been fully covered in the 
original brief filed by Seagull and will not be discussed 
herein, however, it is proper to reply to a few of the 
matters mentioned by Van Zyverdens. 
Seagull generally agrees with the law as stated by Van 
Zyverdens in their reply brief, however, their application 
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of the facts to the law is disputed. Van Zyverdens have 
had much to say about Seagull filing a supplemental 
complaint, however, their argument is essentially that 
Seagull should have asked for permission to file a supple-
mental complaint (Van Zyverden brief, Pages 33, 39-43) 
rather than for permission to amend the pleadings to refer 
to the later notice (R. 233-240) as was done by Seagull 
when Van Zyverdens objected to admission of the second 
notice as being outside the scope of the pleadings (R. 
545). Whether the amendment under Rule 15, URCP, is 
called an amendment or a supplemental pleadings seems 
unimportant. The fact is that Seagull asked to be permit-
ted to refer in its pleadings to the second notice, if the 
Court was of the opinion that said second notice was 
outside the scope of the pleadings and issues in the case. 
Van Zyverdens agree that no good purpose could be 
accomplished by a new action based upon the same facts 
to recover possession of the ranch. (Van Zyverden brief, 
Pages 39-42.) This Court has the power to admit exhibit 5 
(R. 233-240) into evidence without further hearings 
before the District Court. There can be no question that 
based upon notice contained in said exhibit 5 (R. 233-
240) Seagull is entitled to the relief requested in its 
appeal brief on file herein, and judgment should be en-
tered accordingly, and a new trial or hearing should be 
ordered to receive evidence as to the service of said 
exhibit 5, the amount to be allowed as attorney fees, etc. 
The arguments raised by Van Zyverdens as to alleged 
waiver of the notice contained in exhibit 5 (R. 233-240) 
because of statements contained in and legal theories ad-
vanced in other litigation allegedly filed in the District 
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Court (Van Zyverden brief, P. 41) are not before the 
Court, and accordingly the position of Van Zyverdens is 
wholly unsupported by the evidence and the record and 
cannot be considered. The copies of notices allegedly 
served upon Van Zyverdens (R. 725-726, 729) are not 
properly a part of the record in this case for the reason 
that the motion to which they are attached was filed after 
the appeal was taken in this case, and after the District 
Court lost jurisdiction in this matter. Petersen v. Ohio 
Copper Co., 71 U. 444, 266 P. 1050. In any event, said 
notices expressly state that Seagull does not thereby 
waive any rights which may have accrued by reason of or 
in connection with prior notices served, legal proceedings 
pending concerning the property described therein and 
cannot constitute a waiver since a waiver requires the 
voluntary relinquishment of a known legal right and 
requires consideration to support the waiver contract. 
56 Am. Jur. Waiver, 12-16. The authorities cited by Van 
Zyverdens (Van Zyverden Brief, Page 35) are not in 
point since they contemplate a situation where both par-
ties treated the contract as in full force and effect, 
whereas the notices in question expressly state that no 
waiver is intended. The legal position taken by Seagull in 
the two notices mentioned (R. 725-726, 729) is not incon-
sistent with the remedies sought in this action. If Van 
Zyverdens are in fact tenants at will by reason of the first 
notice (R. 266-272) served upon them as contended by 
Van Zyverdens (brief page 31) , certainly so long as they 
remained tenants at will of the property any number of 
new notices could be serVed demanding that they vacate 
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or be guilty of unlawful detainer, and each new notice 
would give rise to a new cause of action. The mention of 
Van Zyverdens as "buyers" in said notices was merely 
descriptive of their connection with the real estate con-
tract in the first instance, and was not a recognition of a 
status which then existed. 
T!he claim of Van Zyverdens that Seagull had been 
defaulted at the time the requests for admissions were 
served in case number 2456 is obviously untrue since 
Seagull was the plaintiff in that action and the only de-
fault entered therein was the default certificate against 
Van Zyverdens for their failure to deny the requests for 
admissions. See discussion at pages 6-8 of Seagull appeal 
brief on file herein. Denial of motion for summary judg-
ment by Judge Tuckett obviously does not bind this 
Court. 
The assertion by Van Zyverdens that Seagull elected at 
the pre-trial conference to proceed in tort and to abandon 
its other claims is simply not true. Judge Tuckett sug-
gested the possibility of proceeding as a mortgage fore-
closure and his offer was declined, Seagull electing to 
proceed under the theories set out in its pleadings. The 
question of Seagull's right to recover attorney fees is a 
matter of law under the terms of the contract between 
the parties and any views expressed by Judge Tuckett 
with respect thereto would not bind this Court. Van 
Zyverdens' view that termination of the buyers' interest 
t;nder the real estate contract (R. 226-227) also termi-
nates the right of the seller to collect attorney fees in 
connection with the action and in accordance with the 
express agreement of the parties is contrary to reason and 
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would amount to the Court's remaking the contract for 
the parties. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
It is obvious that Van Zyverdens have failed to state a 
claim for relief upon which relief can be granted either in 
their pleadings or the pre-trial order and that the propo-
sitions urged by Van Zyverdens are unrealistic and 
merely delaying tactics. On the other hand, Seagull 
should be awarded restitution of the ranch and damages 
by reason of Van Zyverdens' occupation thereof since 
September, 1960, without paying any of his obligations 
under the contract or any part of the purchase price. 
Because of the severe damages being sustained by 
Seagull as a result of Van Zyverdens' appropriation of 
their property without compensation, it is strongly urged 
that restitution be ordered by this Court rather than 
delaying matters with further hearings concerning that 
issue in the District Court and the further delay of pos-
sible additional appeals to this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorney for Seagull Investment Co. 
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